Nobody's home : weighing the prospects for neighborhoods hit hard by foreclosure by Renee Courtois
The eyesore of unkempt lawns has helped the city detect
properties that have become vacant as a result of the hous-
ing downturn and foreclosure crisis. The City of Manassas
received about six tall grass complaints in 2007. By halfway
through 2008, when foreclosures had really begun to mount
around the country, it had received 277. 
Manassas is one of the areas hit hardest by the foreclo-
sure crisis in the Fifth District, together with the nearby city
of Manassas Park and surrounding Prince William County.
All are located just southwest of Washington, D.C. Prince
William’s foreclosure rate is about double that of Virginia as
a whole.
What has been left behind by the nationwide housing
downturn is a record number of vacant homes throughout
the country: nearly 19 million housing units, according to
Census estimates, about 14 percent of total housing units. 
To be sure, many of those empty homes are for sale through
the usual process, while others are seasonal homes or those
listed for rent.
But by all accounts, a larger number of homes than ever
before are vacant as a result of the severe housing downturn.
Most notorious are those in the process of foreclosure or in
real-estate  ownership  (REO)  at  banks  or  other  financial
institutions.  REO  homes  are  foreclosed  properties  from
which the borrower has been fully extricated. The title has
reverted to the lender or, increasingly, a loan servicer hired
to  manage  a  pool  of  properties  on  behalf  of  investors  in 
a  mortgage-backed  security.  Yet,  in  some  cases,  homes
become vacant prior to foreclosure because the resident has
simply given up on the mortgage and walked away.  
Many foreclosed homes are listed for sale, sometimes in a
market saturated with other for-sale properties, which can
depress local house prices if there are enough of them. The
health  of  the  local  housing  market  largely  determines
whether a foreclosed property is maintained: If the cost of
maintenance exceeds the net return from the sale of the
property, the home runs a greater risk of being neglected.
The net return depends on the value of the house and the
loan-to-value ratio. 
Such homes will lack cosmetic maintenance or exhibit
more serious structural damage. Others can be damaged by
normal  seasonal  patterns.  Because  some  are  not  properly
winterized,  pipes  can  freeze  and  burst  in  cold  weather.
Vacant homes without electricity won’t have operating sump
pumps, and the undrained rainfall can result in mold growth. 
The  surrounding  neighborhoods  can  also  suffer  from
foreclosure  since  empty  and  decaying  homes  impose  an
externality. High numbers of vacancies may bring down the
value  of  surrounding  properties.  If  not  maintained,  these
abandoned  homes  may  provide  a  signal  about  the  area’s
desirability  to  potential  buyers.  Some  research  has  also
linked high numbers of foreclosures to crime, fire, and the
resulting strains on local government resources — though
the connections here may be tenuous in some cases. 
It’s not that foreclosure necessarily leads to deterioration
of a home and the neighborhood in which it resides. In areas
that haven’t experienced a large number of foreclosures, a
foreclosed  property  is  more  likely  to  be  cared  for  and 
resold before long. Many foreclosures concentrated in one
area, on the other hand, can imply broader economic strain,
residents’  declining  commitment  to  the  neighborhood, 
or a misalignment of lenders’ and borrowers’ incentives to
produce the best possible outcome for the home and neigh-
borhood. Those are the places in which a local foreclosure
problem is more likely to result in neighborhood blight.
A Tale of Two Crises
There are generally two types of areas heavily affected by
foreclosure. The first is the archetype of the housing boom
and  bust:  areas  like  Phoenix,  Las  Vegas,  and  interior
California  that  experienced  massive  amounts  of  new 
building. Many buyers in these areas based their purchases
on what seemed at the time to be reasonable expectations
about future income and house price appreciation, but those
expectations often did not prove correct.  
The second story is one of structural economic decline
that started long before the housing boom and bust, with
populations abandoning urban cores and, in many cases, the
region as a whole. In areas like Cleveland and Detroit, the
foreclosure  incidence  can  be  timed  not  with  the  fall  in 
housing  prices,  but  with  the  acceleration  of  the  decline 
in  manufacturing  employment  around  the  turn  of  the 
millennium. The  Fifth  District  is  home  to  both  types  of
areas, including supply-ridden Charleston, S.C., and parts 
of the Washington, D.C., area, and regions with longer-term
struggles like Baltimore and much of South Carolina.
This is a simplification, of course, since many areas are
affected by both the housing bust and economic woes. The
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n  some  of  the  nation’s  neighborhoods,  the  height  of  grass  is  a  serious 
economic indicator. “The first indication we have that a house is vacant is
that a neighbor will call about tall grass and weeds,” says Liz Via-Gossman,
director of community development for the city of Manassas, Va. housing downturn surely exacerbated the economic prob-
lems of depressed Ohio and Indiana. And job loss due to the
recession  has  been  a  surefire  way  to  push  Phoenix  and
Miami homeowners into delinquency. In both types of areas,
subprime lending and the credit boom helped get many bor-
rowers into houses they couldn’t sustainably afford. 
For areas in longer-term economic decline, today’s aban-
donment  problems  may  feel  a  lot  like  the  shrinking
industrial centers of the late 1960s and through the 1980s.
For these areas, the decline has been merely exacerbated by
the foreclosure crisis and recession. But the nation’s more
recent  neighborhood  abandonment  problems  also  have
some new elements. For the first time, abandonment seems
to be affecting neighborhoods whose economic prospects
are mostly viable in the long term, and are still intrinsically
desirable places to live.
Though there is abundant research on the problems that
abandoned homes can pose for surrounding communities,
there is a lack of hard data about where vacancies and fore-
closures  have  begun  to  deteriorate  neighborhoods.  “The
problem is, there’s no way to really track this kind of infor-
mation  except  going  out  physically  with  a  clipboard  or
handheld computer and documenting it,” says Alan Mallach,
a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “You can track
foreclosures  because  every  time  somebody  forecloses  a
record is created. But nobody creates records about vacant
and abandoned properties. So there’s no overall way of get-
ting a handle on it.”
Still,  to  get  the  best  sense  of  the  scope  of  the  blight 
problem you should look at cities where the foreclosure inci-
dence is highest (see map on page 24). The comparison isn’t
perfect, however, since not all foreclosures result in long-
term  abandonment  and  decay.  But  what’s  clear  is  that
foreclosures, which can be associated with long-term vacan-
cies,  are  no  longer  occurring  primarily  in  decaying  urban
cores: They are simultaneously affecting small cities, sub-
urbs of big cities, and rural areas.
In the absence of hard data on the problem, local practi-
tioners do the best they can to keep track of and treat vacant
and decaying properties, Via-Gossman says. “I would sus-
pect  when  the  spring  rolls  around  and  we  hit  that  grass
season, then we’ll get this year’s picture about where we are
with vacancies.” 
The Choice to Foreclose
The severity of the housing crisis is redefining what econo-
mists know about the causes of foreclosure.
When economists think about a homeowner’s decision
to default on a mortgage, they borrow from what is called
“option price theory.” An option is a security that entitles
the owner to buy or sell an asset in the future at a predeter-
mined price. A “put” option is useful when one expects the
price of the underlying asset to decrease: The holder can sell
it for a higher price than one would be able to get on the
market. A homeowner’s ability to default on a mortgage is
like a put option when the home’s value is falling, since one
is effectively selling the house to the lender. 
Applying the most simple option model to the housing
market would lead to the conclusion that every homeowner
would default on his mortgage the instant the market value
of his house falls below what he owes on it — a seemingly
alarming  prediction  given  estimates  that  a  quarter  of  all
homeowners are currently “under water” on their mortgage.
The reason we haven’t seen defaults quite that catastrophic
is that in reality there are transaction costs to walking away,
as well as a number of personal considerations. 
But many of the deterrents from walking away are less
present in areas where local house prices are still falling or
the neighborhood has already seen a large number of fore-
closures. This  has  led  to  a  growing  number  of  “strategic
defaults” in which borrowers are technically able to afford
the mortgage, but choose to walk away because they view
the home as a losing investment that will never pay off.
Moral  obligation,  the  stigma  attached  to  default,  and
emotional attachment to one’s home all may prevent some-
one from walking away. But all three are being eaten away 
by the extreme conditions of the current housing market,
says economist Luigi Zingales of the University of Chicago.
Some people may feel less of a moral obligation to make
good on their debts if they are severely under water. (“There
is a price to morality, and when the price becomes too high
you default anyway,” he says.)
People who bought homes as an investment, more com-
























































When no foreclosure has been
completed, complaints about
overgrown lawns can be the
first signal to cities that a
home is abandoned, like this




in this Fairfax, V a.,
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mon  during  the  housing  and  lending  boom,  especially  in
areas currently most afflicted by housing oversupply, don’t
face the transaction and emotional costs of moving. “Second
homes and especially investments are where people look at
their choice to buy a house in a strictly rational or financial
way, and it’s much more likely that they will walk away when
there’s not the emotional investment that there is in their
main residence,” Zingales says.
And people are more likely to walk away when they know
one or several people who have defaulted strategically. “If
everybody  does  it  then  it  becomes  socially  acceptable,”
Zingales  says. A  2009  study  by  Zingales  and  economists
Luigi Guiso and Paola Sapienza collected survey data that
indicate  people  who  know  someone  who  has  defaulted
strategically are 82 percent more likely to say they’d be will-
ing to also default strategically should they find themselves
severely under water. “There might be some critical point
beyond  which  the  social  stigma  breaks  down,  and  then
defaults spread like wildfire,” he says.
Given that the costs to borrowers of walking away appear
to be diminishing, it is not surprising that lenders face a
tough  choice  when  deciding  whether  to  help  a  borrower
avoid foreclosure by modifying the terms of their original
mortgage. It is often in the best interest of the counterparty
to a mortgage to avoid foreclosure. So if foreclosure seems
imminent under the existing mortgage terms, lenders may
be willing to modify them for the borrower, by reducing the
interest rate or principle, for example.
Of course, modifying a mortgage reduces the expected
return from the mortgage for the lender, but under certain
circumstances it may still be worthwhile. If the state does
not have “recourse” laws — which allow the lender to go
after a borrower’s other assets in the event of default — then
lenders may be more willing to modify the mortgage to avoid
foreclosure.  This  has  an  influence  on  the  borrower’s 
incentives too. Research by City University of New York
economist  Andra  Ghent  and  Richmond  Fed  economist
Marianna Kudlyak found that recourse laws are a powerful
deterrent  to  foreclosure  since  they  increases  the  cost  to 
borrowers of walking away.  
But lenders who do offer modifications face an adverse
selection problem since mortgages that are modified tend to
have a high re-default rate, according to a study by Boston
Fed economists Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, and
Paul Willen. Some loan modifications will simply delay the
inevitable. Since lenders know this, and there is no way to
know in advance who will prove to re-default, it may reduce
their  willingness  to  modify  loans  for  everyone. This  may 
partially explain why relatively few mortgages nationwide
have been modified so far. 
From Vacancy to Blight
The health of the local housing market in part determines
the fate of foreclosed homes in an area. Therefore, whether
an area’s economic prospects are generally weak or strong 
is  a  key  determinant  of  whether  a  high  foreclosure  rate 
evolves  into  a  broader  problem  of  neighborhood  decay.
Unfortunately,  the  lenders’  incentives  once  foreclosure  is
imminent  are  not  always  aligned  with  the  health  of  the
neighborhood.
“What the lender wants to do is dispose of the property
in a way that maximizes its return,” says Guhan Venkatu, an
economist  at  the  Cleveland  Fed.  A  foreclosed  property 
generates no income and is costly to maintain. So in most
cases, the lenders’ incentive is to minimize the amount of
time that a vacant property is sitting on their books. 
Expediting foreclosure is not always an option for the
lender. Some states have a “judicial” foreclosure process in
which foreclosure requires a court action. In those states
foreclosures take much longer and are administratively cost-
lier to the lender. Perhaps more importantly, Venkatu says, it
imposes less flexibility on the lender to make the decision
that maximizes the value of the property for them.
Dragging out foreclosure, on the other hand, may also be
an option. In areas hit by many foreclosures, the prospects
for reselling property at a reasonable price may appear more
dismal to lenders, providing an incentive for them to delay
the foreclosure process.
“They’re  just  letting  the  process  slow  down,”  Mallach
says. Instead of initiating foreclosure when a home becomes
90-days delinquent, when foreclosure legally becomes a pos-
sibility, he says they might wait 180 or 210 days, or longer to
help them wait out the market. And since in these cases
eventually selling the property is the goal, he says the lender
sometimes doesn’t want it vacated and subject to decay. “I’ve
Percent of Mortgages in Foreclosure/REO in the 
Fifth District
NOTE: Uncategorized zip codes have fewer than 
100 loans or no data available.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
estimates using data from Lender Processing Services (LPS) Applied
Analytics (November 2009) and 






6.0+heard  in  some  cases  that  some
lenders  will  actually  call  up  the
homeowners  and  say,  ‘Please  don’t
leave  the  house.  Stick  around.  We
know you’re not paying.’”
Mallach  says  it  lacks  a  catchy
name so far, but the phenomenon is
what those in the industry are calling
a  “shadow  REO  inventory.”  “That
means this huge inventory of proper-
ties  that  could  become  REO
properties but aren’t because the ser-
vicers are not pushing to finalize the
process  that  would  turn  them  into
REO  properties.”  Some  estimates
claim these properties number in the
millions.
Observers  in  the  industry  have
also noted a new occurrence in which
lenders and loan servicers who have
acquired properties through foreclo-
sure  withhold  those  homes  from 
the  market  for  fear  of  depressing
prices further in an already supply-
saturated area.  
Dragging  out  foreclosure  and
withholding REOs from the market
can  make  the  housing  statistics
appear rosier since it could lead to an
underestimation  of  supply.  It  also
lengthens  the  market  adjustment
process, and masks how many homes
are, or will eventually be, on banks’
balance sheets.
In the very worst areas, mortgage
defaults become the city’s problem.
If  the  prospects  for  reselling  the
property are extremely poor, the cost
of  foreclosure  and  maintaining  the
property  may  exceed  the  value  the
property holds for the lender. In the case of so-called “toxic
titles,” the tenant has defaulted and vacated the house, but
the lender never completes the process to take legal owner-
ship. This leaves the property in a state of legal limbo: The
lender holds the lien, but the tenant technically owns the
home. Meanwhile, the house sits empty and often deterio-
rating or subject to vandalism, with no steps being taken to
bring it back to market. Toxic titles are most likely to be
found in very low value areas where the market is essentially
nonexistent, Mallach says. 
Stabilization and Revitalization
Neighborhood  stabilization  is  the  key  to  neighborhood
recovery, according to Mallach. He defines a stable market
as one in which homeowners and potential buyers feel their
investment is secure. “If you have a neighborhood that has
been losing ground and people in it
are  basically  just  hoping  to  move
out,  and  nobody  in  particular  is
eager to move in, if you start to see
a significant number of foreclosures
it’s likely to have a much more dra-
matic effect than the same number
in a neighborhood that is still seen
by its residents, and by other people
in the region, as being desirable.”
The  federal  government  has
devoted  funds  to  help  deal  with
vacant and abandoned homes. The
federal Neighborhood Stabilization
Program  (NSP)  directs  funds 
(about $6 billion in total under the 
2008 and 2009 economic recovery 
acts) to local governments and com-
munity  developers  to  try  to  stem
falling home values in areas already
hit hard by foreclosure. 
The  funds  could  be  used  for  a
number of things that try to main-
tain  or  improve  the  condition  of
abandoned  properties.  Funds  can
help community organizations pur-
chase and rehabilitate deteriorated
homes,  for  example,  or  establish
“land  banks”  (local  legal  entities
that  hold  vacant,  abandoned,  and
foreclosed  properties  and  transfer
them back to productive use). The
money also can fund incentives to
get homeowners into empty homes.
Community  organizations  and
local  governments  have  found  it
hard to implement NSP funds, how-
ever, for a variety of reasons. Among
the  largest  is  difficulty  identifying
the current owner of the mortgage.
Only the original lender is listed in the loan documentation,
whereas most mortgages today are sold after initiation in
secondary mortgage markets and ultimately to large groups
of  unnamed  investors.  The  loan  servicers  who  represent
these  investors  may  be  located  in  a  completely  different
region,  and  thus  have  no  expertise  on  the  local  housing 
market  in  question,  and  may  have  any  number  of  other 
distressed properties they are also managing. And in the case
of toxic titles, it takes legwork and legal expertise to deter-
mine who owns the property.
Even when the loan servicer is identified, they often have
limited discretion when dealing with resale of the property.
Service agreements obligate them to maximize the value of
the trust for the investor owners, but these agreements were
written in a dramatically different housing market environ-
ment  in  which  it  would  have  been  hard  to  imagine  the
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Delinquent: Mortgages for which the 
borrower has ceased mortgage payments.
Typically, foreclosure can be initiated after 
90 days of delinquency.
In Foreclosure: Properties for which the fore-
closure process has been initiated. There is no
national standard for length of the foreclosure
process.
Bank owned or REO (real estate owned):
Properties that have gone through 
the foreclosure process (i.e., the homeowner 
is fully extricated from the loan) and are now
owned by the lender or the trust that has 
purchased the mortgage as part of a 
mortgage-backed security.
Vacant: A home that, for whatever reason, is
not legally occupied. Most foreclosed and REO
properties are vacant, although not all vacant
homes are in foreclosure or REO. Sometimes
the borrower has given up on the mortgage
and vacated the property.
Toxic titles: Homes for which the 
borrower has ceased mortgage payments and
vacated, but for which there is no immediate
intention to foreclose. The foreclosure process
costs more than the home is worth on the 
current market, so for a lender or loan servicer
it makes better financial sense to walk away
than to complete the foreclosure. The result
can be homes with unclear legal ownership.
These exist in areas where the housing market
is especially weak.
The Status of Distressed Homesdiscounted  sales  of  distressed  properties  to  local  govern-
ments and nonprofits.
There is no reason to believe that overbuilt neighbor-
hoods  must  stay  empty  forever. Venkatu  sees  an  analogy
between  fundamentally  desirable  neighborhoods  and  the
vast expansions and oversupply of fiber-optic capacity dur-
ing the late 1990s tech boom. “It’s not like that stuff doesn’t
get used,” he says. “It gets used — it just gets sold at a loss.”
At some point these new developments — which for now
look more like movie sets than neighborhoods — will start
to look attractive to buyers. 
Not all homes will be candidates for resale. In economi-
cally declining areas that are rapidly losing both jobs and
residents, the strategy of community organizations buying
and rehabbing homes nicely and trying to sell them would
almost  certainly  be  a  failure.  “And  in  fact,  it  should  be,”
Mallach says, “because it’s crazy to spend that kind of money
or try to entice people into a neighborhood that may be
already three-quarters empty,” he says. 
That may be where there is potential to find alternative
uses for vacant homes, from rental units to office space or, at
the extreme, razing the property to use the land for some-
thing  else.  But  this  requires  new  strategic  plans  for  the
community  at  a  time  when  local  governments  are  being
stretched  thin. When  faced  with  the  choice  of  spending
resources  to  convene  local  community  organizations  and
neighbors to gain consensus on the direction of an aban-
doned property, or funneling those resources to programs
that attract jobs, the latter often seems to be the priority.
And perhaps that’s for good reason. Job opportunities are
a large part of what will make neighborhoods hit hard by
foreclosures once again desirable places to live. For many
areas affected by foreclosure, economic recovery that brings
strong employment prospects and income stability, as well as
a well-functioning housing market, may be the quickest path
to community revitalization.  RF
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along with proposals to adjust the population figures after-
ward using statistical sample results.
“The methodology in 2000 could not be shown to be an
improvement over the actual enumeration,” Anderson says.
“You have to argue that it is better, not just that it’s different,
and  there  are  big  arguments  over  what  better  means  —
numerical accuracy, distributive accuracy, all of which get
tangled up in the politics of it.”
Anderson further explains: “There were two approaches;
one was that the Census Bureau should improve the method
to reach everybody and the other was that it’s more efficient
and  potentially  more  accurate  to  use  statistical  metho-
dology.”  Many  statisticians  and  demographers  believe  the
sound methodology of sampling techniques could provide
more  accuracy,  but  the  two  main  political  parties  have
staked out opposite positions. That has made compromise
unworkable. Not surprisingly, the census has become a polit-
ical  issue.  Republicans  have  tended  to  favor  unadjusted
counts while Democrats tend to support adjustments. Most
Americans, Anderson says, don’t object to sampling, but do
worry about the possibility of political machinations behind
technical matters that are hard to understand. 
In any case, methods for counting people are likely to
always be an imperfect way to capture the scope of a con-
stantly  evolving  nation.  The  controversies  over  how  we
count may be as recurrent as the decennial census.          RF